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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Although he waived his right do so, Trevor James Booth appeals from the
judgment entered upon his guilty plea to second-degree murder, contending,
based on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Oneida v. Oneida, 95 Idaho
105, 503 P.2d 305 (1972), the state has "missed its opportunity" to seek
dismissal of his appeal on this basis by failing to file a motion to dismiss prior to
briefing. Booth also claims his sentence is excessive.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings
"On January 16, 2005, Leonard Kellum died as a result of multiple gunshot
wounds that he sustained at his residence." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 614,
262 P.3d 255, 257 (2011 ). Following an investigation, police arrested Booth and
the state charged him with first-degree murder.

kl

Although the state "declined

to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, thereby establishing that
Booth's case was a non-capital case," Booth later "agreed to plead guilty to firstdegree murder in exchange for the State's agreement not to pursue statutory
aggravating circumstances as part of sentencing."

kl

at 614, 616, 262 P.3d at

257, 259. The district court sentenced Booth to life with thirty years fixed and
Booth unsuccessfully challenged that sentence on appeal.

kl at 616,

262 P.3d

at 259.
Booth subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Booth, 151
Idaho at 616, 262 P.3d at 259.

The district court conducted an evidentiary

hearing after which it concluded Booth's trial counsel's representation "fell below

1

an objective standard of reasonableness because [counsel] erroneously advised
Booth that he would be subject to a mandatory fixed life sentence if he went to
trial and the State's special verdict form [on statutory aggravating circumstances)
was presented to the jury."

lg,_ at 617, 262 P.3d at 260.

"The court also

determined that there was a reasonable probability that but for [counsel's]
erroneous interpretation of the statute, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and
would have proceeded to trial." lg,_ The district court, therefore, "granted Booth's
petition for post-conviction relief and ordered his guilty plea to be withdrawn and
the case set for jury trial." lg,_ The state appealed and the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's order granting Booth's petition for post-conviction
relief and the case was remanded. lg,_ at 622, 262 P.3d at 265.
On remand, the case was set for trial. (R., p.17.) However, Booth again
pied guilty. (R., p.22.) This time, Booth agreed to plead guilty to an amended
charge of second-degree murder with no agreement as to sentencing. (Tr., p.6,
Ls.23-25; R., p.22.) Booth also agreed to waive his "Rule 35 rights, appellate
rights, and post-conviction relief rights." (Tr., p.6., Ls.6-9.) Booth entered a guilty
plea pursuant to those terms. (Tr., pp.13-20.)
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a unified
life sentence with 20 years fixed. (Tr., p.97, Ls.7-9; R., pp.44-45.) Ignoring his
prior waiver, Booth filed a pro se notice of appeal timely from the judgment and a
request for counsel on appeal.

(R., pp.51-54, 63-66.)

The state filed an

objection to both based on Booth's waiver of his right to appeal. (R., pp.67-68.)

2

The court 1 entered an order granting Booth's request for appellate counsel,
which order does not reflect the state's objection. (R., pp.69-70.) The state filed
a motion to strike the order of appointment and a notice of hearing. (R., pp.7273.)
At the hearing on the state's motion to strike, Booth was represented by a
deputy state appellate public defender. (R., p.82.) Booth requested additional
time to review the matter, and the court continued the hearing. (R., pp.83-85.)
At the continued hearing, the court "reversed the prior appointment of the State
Appellate Public Defender." 2 (R., p.92; also pp.94-96.)
One month after the district court "rescind[ed] and quash[ed]" the order
appointing the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"), the SAPD filed a
Notice of Intent Not to Seek Leave to Withdraw with the Idaho Supreme Court
("Notice"), asserting the district court's order is "invalid" because, "once counsel
is appointed on appeal, 'counsel may withdraw as the attorney of record for a
party in a civil or criminal appeal only by order of the Supreme Court upon
motion showing good cause."'

(Notice, p.3 (emphasis original).)

Contending

there was no good cause to withdraw, the SAPD notified the Court it did not
intend to seek leave to do so. (Notice, pp.3-4.) Six days later, the Court entered

1

The Honorable Gregory Culet entered the judgment in Booth's case, but the
Honorable James Morfitt entered the order appointing counsel on appeal. (R.,
pp. 50, 70.)
2

Curiously, Booth did not request preparation of these transcripts on appeal or
even acknowledge this aspect of the proceedings. It is presumed that any
missing portions of the record support the actions of the court below. State v.
Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992) (missing
portions of the record are presumed to support the actions of the court below).

3

an order stating that the SAPD "shall remain as counsel of record for Appellant
Trevor James Booth for further proceedings in this appeal, until further Order of
th[e] Court." (R., p.100.)

4

ISSUES
Booth states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing
upon Mr. Booth a sentence which is excessive given any view of
the facts?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Should this Court reject Booth's claim that the state may not seek to
dismiss an appeal based on an appellate waiver unless it does so "prior to the
filing of appellate briefing" and dismiss Booth's appeal since he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement?
2.
Even if the Court does not enforce Booth's waiver of his right to appeal,
has Booth failed to establish that a life sentence with 20 years fixed for murder
constitutes an abuse of discretion?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

Booth's Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because He Knowingly And Voluntarily
Waived The Right To Appeal Pursuant To The Plea Agreement
A.

Introduction
Booth acknowledges he waived his right to appeal but contends, in a

footnote, the state has "missed its opportunity" to seek dismissal of his appeal on
that basis by failing to file "a motion to dismiss, prior to the filing of the appellate
briefing." (Appellant's Brief, p.3 n.2 (emphasis original).) Based on his belief that
his appeal cannot be dismissed, Booth argues the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a unified life sentence with 20 years fixed for the murder
of Leonard Kellum. (See generally Appellant's Brief.)
The record demonstrates Booth knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to appeal.

It is well-established that the appellate courts of this state may

dismiss an appeal on this basis.

Booth's claim that the state has "missed its

opportunity" to enforce his plea waiver should be rejected and his appeal should
be dismissed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract

law standards, and as a question of law, [the appellate court] exercises free
review." State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,495, 129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 63, 106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004)). Where the waiver
of the right to appeal is entered as part of a plea agreement, the appellate court
"employ[s] the same analysis as [it] would in determining the validity of any plea

6

of guilty."

State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994),

quoted in Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245.

C.

This Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because The Record Shows Booth
Knowingly And Voluntarily Waived The Right To Appeal
"A defendant may waive his right to appeal as part of a guilty plea

agreement." State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013);
also I.C.R. 11 (f)(1) ("The prosecuting attorney and the attorney for the defendant
or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view
toward reaching an agreement, which may include a waiver of the defendant's
right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court .... "). When the waiver of
the right to appeal is included as a term of a plea agreement, such waiver is
enforceable as long as the record shows that it was voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made.

State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 496, 129 P.3d 1241, 1245

(2006); State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456,457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994).
At the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor recited the terms of the plea
agreement, including: "Number three, there will be a written - I'm going to call it
a Rule 11 waiver of Rule 35 rights, appellate rights, and post-conviction relief
rights on the behalf of Mr. Booth that will be filed prior to sentencing on this
particular case." 3 (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-11.) Trial counsel acknowledged that term in the

3

It does not appear a written agreement was ever filed with the district court.
According to the court minutes from the first hearing on the state's motion to
quash the appointment of the SAPD, trial counsel "was supposed to file a written
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, however it had not been filed." (R., p.83.) Trial
counsel was not present at that hearing because he apparently began to
"primarily reside[ ] in the country of Mexico" at some point after Booth was
sentenced. (R., p. 75.)

7

agreement both at the time the prosecutor recited it (Tr., p.6, L.23) and expressly
reaffirmed it prior to Booth's guilty plea, stating:

"there's been two appeals

involving [Booth], and so he understands by waiving his appellate rights what
he's doing, and he's prepared to do that as well" (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-8). Booth also
expressly acknowledged the waiver during the following portion of his guilty plea
colloquy:
THE COURT: ... There are certain rights someone normally has
at the conclusion of sentence that you would be agreeing to waive
in this case. And I'll -- even though I'm going to go through it orally
now, I'll ask counsel to prepare the subpoena [sic] -- right, just to
make sure the record is clear -- one, as long as I operate within the
parameters allowed by me and consider everything, you'd be
waiving your appeal of any final sentence in this case. You
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Correct.
THE COURT: At least, that' my understanding of your agreement.
And you're telling me that's true?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(Tr. , p. 18, Ls. 1-1 5.)
Booth also told the presentence investigator that he "waive[d] all [his)
rights to appeals" (2011 PSI, p.14), and the court reiterated the waiver at the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing.

Without any objection from Booth, the

court stated it was not "doing the post-judgment rights, because those were
waived as part of the agreement to amend the charge from first to second." (Tr.,
p.97, Ls.18-21.)
The district court also made findings in relation to the motion to strike the
appointment of the SAPD regarding Booth's waiver of his right to appeal. (See

8

R., p.92.) In fact, the court included the following findings in its order quashing

the appointment of the SAPD:
1. On October 24, 2011, the Defendant Trevor Booth appeared
before the Court with his attorney of record Van Bishop.
2. At that hearing, the Defendant Trevor Booth entered a plea of
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement whereby he waived his rights
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, his rights to appeal any issue herein,
and his rights to any additional post-conviction relief proceedings as
a part of the plea agreement reducing the charge herein to Second
Degree Murder.
3. The Court accepted the waivers in open court on October 24,
2011, and at sentencing on December 19, 2011 again reminded the
Defendant Trevor Booth that he had waived the above noted rights.
4. The Transcript of the Hearing for Change of Plea shows that the
Defendant Trevor Booth provided the Court a voluntary, knowing
and intelligent waiver of all of his rights to appeal the conviction and
sentence herein and all of his rights under Idaho Criminal Rule 35
in this matter in exchange for the State's offer to reduce the charge
from First Degree Murder to Second Degree Murder.
5. The Defendant Trevor Booth is bound by the terms of the plea
agreement herein and has waived the rights he seeks to assert
through both the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and the filing
of the Notice of Appeal.
(R., pp.94-95.)

In light of Booth's unambiguous, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his right
to appeal, this appeal should be dismissed. Booth acknowledges his waiver in a
footnote, but argues the state "has missed its opportunity" to "invoke" the waiver.
(Appellant' Brief, p.3.) In support of his argument, Booth relies exclusively on
Oneida v. Oneida, 95 Idaho 105, 503 P.2d 305 (1972).
Oneida is misleading and misplaced.

9

Booth's reliance on

The Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have, in numerous
cases, considered after briefing whether a criminal defendant waived his right to
appeal as part of his plea agreement. Straub, 153 Idaho at 885-886, 292 P.3d at
276-277; Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 496, 129 P.3d 1241, 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho
456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720; State v. Hansen, 2012 WL 6634131 *2 (Ct. App.
Dec. 19, 2012); State v. Rodriguez, 142 Idaho 786, 133 P.3d 1251 (Ct. App.
2006); State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 270, 141 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Ct. App. 2006);
State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). Booth
does not acknowledge any of these cases. He only cites Oneida and claims,
based on that case, the state was required to file a "motion to dismiss, prior to
the filing of the appellate briefing, if it hopes to obtain dismissal of the appellant's

appeal based on a waiver of appellate rights." (Appellant's Brief, p.3 (emphasis
original).) Booth is incorrect.
Oneida involved a dispute between shareholders of an Idaho corporation.
95 Idaho at 105, 503 P.2d at 305. 'The pleadings were superseded by a written
pre-trial stipulation wherein the parties agreed" to certain issues "to be
determined by the district court." ls;L At the beginning of the hearing to determine
one of the issues, the court inquired whether its ruling would be an appealable
order or whether the parties would "stipulate" to "move into the next part of the
case." ls;L at 106, 503 P.2d at 306. Both parties indicated their willingness to
stipulate it was not an appealable order. ls;L Despite the stipulation, one party
filed a notice of appeal after the court resolved the first issue against it.

ilt

The

respondents on appeal argued "the appellant waived their right to appeal the

10

district court' order." ~ In response to this argument, the Idaho Supreme Court
stated:
As the appellants correctly point out, however, an objection based
upon such a stipulation should be raised by a motion to dismiss the
appeal. Southern Indiana Power Co. v. Cook, 182 Ind. 505, 107
N.E. 12 (1914); Speeth v. Fields, 71 N.E.2d 149 (Ohio App. 1946)
(per curiam); 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error s 240 (1962); see
Phelps v. Blome, 150 Neb. 547, 35 N.W.2d 93 (1948); cf 4
Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error s 241 (1962). Raising such an
objection at the earliest stage of appellate proceedings may spare
the appellant further useless expenditures (for, e.g., an appeal
bond, transcripts and additional attorneys' fees). Having failed to
move to dismiss the appeal, the respondents are in no position to
rely in their appellate brief, upon the alleged waiver of the right to
appeal.
Onedia, 95 Idaho at 106-107, 503 P.2d at 306-307 (footnote omitted).
There are at least two significant differences between this case and
Oneida.

First, Oneida involved a stipulation that the parties would proceed to

"move into the next part of the case" rather than pursue an interlocutory appeal of
the court's first determination and, therefore, did not involve an appeal waiver.
The second, but related, difference is that Oneida involved an appeal from an
intermediate decision by the district court.

Unlike Oneida, the waiver at issue

here involves a plea agreement relating to the disposition of the entire case and
an appeal from a final judgment. Nothing in Oneida forecloses the state's ability
to seek dismissal of an appeal short of a pre-briefing motion to dismiss where, as
here,

a

final

judgment

has

been

11

entered.

Moreover,

Oneida

does not, as Booth claims, include a pre-briefing motion requirement at all. 4
What Oneida says is that "an objection based upon ... a stipulation [not to
appeal] should be raised by a motion to dismiss the appeal." 95 Idaho at 107,
503 P.2d at 307. The Court then noted that "[r]aising such an objection at the
earliest stage of appellate proceedings may spare the appellant further useless
expenditures" such as "an appeal bond, transcripts, and additional attorneys'
fees."

kl

While the identified expenditures would typically be incurred prior to

briefing, the Court does not define what "the earliest stage of appellate
proceedings" is and the Court even acknowledges that filing a motion to dismiss
will not "always spare the appellant" costs associated with an appeal since "[a]n
appellate court may deny such a motion but nevertheless dismiss the appeal
after briefing and argument." Onedia, 95 Idaho at 107 n.2, 503 P.2d at 307 n.2.
Indeed, it is unclear how an appellate court could adequately consider a motion
to dismiss without the preparation of transcripts and portions of the record that
would be relevant to the question of waiver.
Beyond the factual and procedural differences between this case and
Oneida, the law regarding appellate waivers that has developed since Oneida is
inconsistent with Booth's claim that the state is barred from seeking dismissal at

Booth characterizes this alleged requirement as a holding. (Appellant's Brief,
p.3 n.2 ("In Oneida v. Oneida, 95 Idaho 105 (1972), the Idaho Supreme Court
held that the respondent in an appeal must file a motion to dismiss, prior to the
filing of the appellate briefing, if it hopes to obtain dismissal of the appellant's
appeal based on a waiver of appellate rights[.]") (italics original, bold added).)
The Court, however, ultimately dismissed the appeal in Oneida because it was
from an unappealable intermediate decision. Thus, the Court's discussion of the
respondent's obligation to file a motion to dismiss the appeal was ultimately dicta
since it was not "necessary to the decision." State v. Hawkins, 2013 WL
1632100 *4 (2013).
4
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this juncture.

To the extent this Court considers Oneida at all relevant to the

analysis, it should be disavowed.
The Idaho Supreme Court "will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior
opinions unless it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the
case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust." State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho
511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted).

Oneida provides no

compelling reason to require the state to seek dismissal of an appeal in a
criminal case at some undetermined time characterized as "the earliest stage of
appellate proceedings." The only justification apparent from the opinion is that
requiring as much "may spare the appellant further useless expenditures."
Oneida, 95 Idaho at 107, 503 P.2d at 307.

As previously noted, however, a

motion to dismiss will not necessarily accomplish this goal because of the need
to have an adequate record to consider the waiver issue.
More importantly, it will not always be clear from the outset that an appeal
would be subject to dismissal as a result of a waiver.

In most cases, the

appellate court must assess the scope and applicability of the waiver first before
determining whether a case should be dismissed or whether the issues raised
should be considered on the merits. Straub is a perfect example.
Straub challenged the district court's restitution award. In response, the
state asserted that Straub, as part of the plea agreement, waived his right to
challenge the restitution award. 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276. Straub did
"not appeal the waiver itself, but rather the scope of that waiver." lit_ The Court,
interpreting the plea agreement, ultimately concluded Straub's waiver did not

13

encompass his right to challenge the restitution award because his agreement
not to appeal "any rulings made by the court" referred only to those rulings "made
prior to the agreement."

.tsL. Thus, the Court considered the merits of Straub's

claims related to restitution. It would have been the opposite of judicial efficiency
in Straub for the Court to first consider a motion to dismiss the appeal based on
the waiver and then later consider the merits of the issues raised in the appeal.
Further, whatever cost savings a particular defendant might enjoy if the
state filed a motion to dismiss at "the earliest stage of appellate proceedings" is
also not particularly persuasive given that it is the defendant's choice to incur
those costs knowing that he has waived his right to appeal. 5
"It is not just the prosecutor who is bound by a plea agreement.

A

defendant also is obligated to adhere to its terms, and the State is entitled to
receive the benefit of its bargain." Holdaway, 130 Idaho at 484, 943 P.2d at 74.
Although the state has already been deprived of part of the benefit of its bargain
by having to respond to Booth's appeal at all, it should not be further deprived of
the benefit of its bargain by having this Court consider the merits of Booth's claim
simply because resources have already been expended in relation to this appeal.

5

To the extent Booth relies on this cost-savings rationale, his reliance is ironic
since he has not actually incurred any costs related to his appeal as a result of
his indigency. (See R., pp.69-70 (Order Appointment State Appellate Public
Defender in Direct Appeal), 119 (Order Granting Defendant-Appellant's Motion
for Waiver of Reporter's Fees and Clerk's Fee).) The fact that Booth continued
to pursue this appeal after the state filed an objection to the appeal based on the
waiver, which the state filed the day after Booth filed his notice of appeal (R.,
pp.51, 67-68), also makes Booth's complaint about the failure to file a motion to
dismiss before he went to the trouble of filing a brief disingenuous.
14

This Court should reject Booth's claim that the state has "missed its opportunity
to seek dismissal" and dismiss this appeal.

II.

Even If This Court Declines To Dismiss This Appeal, Booth Has Failed To
Establish He Is Entitled To Sentencing Relief
A.

Introduction
Booth argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence,

asserting his sentence is excessive given his "generally good character,"
acceptance

of

responsibility,

expressions

of

remorse,

behavior

while

incarcerated, and family support. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14, 20.) None of Booth's
arguments support his claim that his sentence is excessive. Application of wellestablished sentencing standards to the facts presented to the district court
reveals Booth has failed to meet his heavy burden of establishing the district
court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ."~
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Booth Has Failed To Establish A Unified Life Sentence With 20 Years
Fixed For Murder Is Excessive

C.

"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."
Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted).
"When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an
independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest."
Id.

A review of the record demonstrates that a unified life sentence with 20

years fixed for the murder of Leonard Kellum was more than reasonable. Booth
has failed to establish otherwise.
The four objectives of sentencing are well-established.

They are "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution."

State v.

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and
citations omitted). "A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be
sufficient."

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)

(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App.
1991)).
Booth cites a number of factors he believes support his assertion that the
district court abused it sentencing discretion. Specifically, Booth highlights his
"generally good character," as demonstrated by his childhood and work ethic, his
acceptance of responsibility "for his crime," and his remorse, behavior while
incarcerated, and family support.

(See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.4-21.)
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None of these factors compel the extraordinary conclusion that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing a unified life sentence with 20 years fixed.
Although Booth insists his expressions of remorse to Leonard's family are
genuine and credible (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-18), the fact they are accompanied
by attacks on Leonard's character deprives them of much meaning (Appellant's
Brief, pp.9-11).

Similarly, Booth's "acceptance of responsibility" argument is

undercut by the fact that he has pursued this appeal that he expressly waived as
a component of accepting responsibility.

The same cynic who may dare

"assume" that Booth's "statements accepting responsibility and expressing
remorse were nothing more than a bunch of contrivances, calculated to
manipulate the district court" (Appellant' Brief, p.18), might also suggest that
Booth agreed to waive his right to appeal in an effort to gain favor with the district
court only to file an appeal when that concession was not adequate to gain him
the sentence he wanted.
As for Booth's good performance while incarcerated, it is clear the district
court considered this information and it was likely a factor in the reduction in
Booth's fixed term from 30 years to 20 years. At sentencing, the court stated,
"Mr. Booth, you have had a chance to demonstrate in the seven years [since the
first sentencing,] the ability to sort of take the high road while you're in prison, to
the extent that can be done." (Tr., p.94, Ls.13-16.) However, Booth was a drug
dealer who shot Leonard five times, killing him. Even if Booth does not believe
he presents a threat to society, murder requires punishment and a sentence that
takes into account retribution and deterrence. See State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho
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776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989) ("To the extent that a minimum
period of confinement represents the judicially determined 'price' of a crime, the
criteria of retribution and deterrence are particularly important.")
In the end, the district court considered the appropriate sentencing factors,
the nature of the offense, and Booth's character, including the mitigating
evidence presented to the court, and imposed a unified life sentence with 20
years fixed. (Tr., p.93, L.22 - p.97, L.9.) Booth's sentence was not excessive
when it was life with 30 years fixed and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
it is certainly not excessive now that the fixed term is 10 years less. Assuming
this Court considers Booth's excessive sentence argument, Booth has failed to
establish the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this appeal or, in
the alternative, affirm the judgment and sentence entered upon Booth's guilty
plea to second-degree murder.
DATED this 2nd day of July 2013.
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